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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 782a-3(2)(h).
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

While Appellant and Appellee were married they were members of a limited

liability corporation that owned a hotel. When the hotel was sold, the four members of
the corporation signed an agreement that in part allocated proceeds of the sale among the
members. The trial court found that the proceeds so allocated to Appellant and Appellee
constituted marital property and considered evidence of the agreement. Did the trial
court err when it considered evidence of the agreement allocating proceeds among the
members?
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2.

The trial court found that amounts owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen constituted

marital debt. The trial court further found that regular payments on the debt, as well as
other testimony and exhibits, amounted to an acknowledgment of the debt and that the
debt was therefore not barred by the statute of limitations. Did the trial court err when it
declined to apply the statute of limitations to the debt owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen?
3.

The trial court found that amounts owed to Robert and LaRue Larson included debts

on loans for business inventory and interest. Did the trial court err in so finding?
Standard of Review
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of the properties in a
divorce action, Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982), the trial court has
considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property interests, and its action are
entitled to a presumption of validity. Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah
1983). Changes will be made only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of
the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion. English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d
395, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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FACTS
This appeal concerns a divorce and related property division. The parties were
married on August 9, 1974. Because of difficulties in the marriage that the parties were
unable to resolve, Appellee Alan Larsen filed for divorce. On February 23, 2004 a bench
trial was held before Judge Paul D. Lyman. Judge Lyman divided the marital property,
awarded child support, and entered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
After analysis of the parties' financial conditions, the trial court determined that
the parties so commingled the assets and debts of their various business activities, and
commingled business assets and debts with their personal assets and debts, that the court
had to consider all assets and debts together when determining marital property.
(Amended Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law f 19).
The parties, along with two other individuals, had been members of RCI, LC, a
limited liability company. (Trial Tr. p. 128:17-19). Prior to the divorce, RCI, LC sold a
hotel it owned and the four members signed a settlement agreement distributing the
proceeds of the sale among themselves. In order to determine a division of assets in the
divorce action the trial court heard testimony regarding the settlement agreement and the
amounts received by appellant and appellee from the sale. (Trial Tr. p. 12-13; 34-37;
127-135; 178-180). Evidence was tendered and testimony proffered showing that
appellee received $150,000.00 and that appellant received $200,000.00 from the sale of
the hotel. (Trial Tr. p. 34:16-17; 35:4-6).
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Over the years the parties had borrowed money from Robert and LaRue Larsen.
The court heard testimony and took exhibits regarding these various debts. The court also
heard testimony and took exhibits regarding payments made over time to service and in
some cases retire various of these debts. (See, e.g. Exhibits 2, 12, 26, 27; Trial Tr. pp.
42-47; Trial Tr. pp. 81-83; 85-92; Trial Tr. pp. 154-57).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
L The trial court properly heard evidence of a settlement agreement between the parties
Under Utah law, The trial court's duty to make an equitable division of property in
a divorce action encompasses all of the assets possessed by the parties. The trial court
must distribute property between the parties in a fair, systematic fashion and should
catagorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate property of
one or the other. Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate
property and fifty percent of the marital property. Once the trial court finds that an item is
marital property, the law presumes that it will be shared equally between the parties
unless unusual circumstances, memorialized in adequate findings, require otherwise. It is
well established that the trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting the
financial and property interests in a divorce case.
It is the trial court's prerogative in divorce actions to make whatever disposition of
property, including the rights fixed in settlement agreements, as it deems fair, equitable,
and necessary for the protection and welfare of the parties. Although property settlements
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should be given great weight in the court's determination of an equitable division,
property settlements are not binding upon trial courts in divorce proceedings and the court
need not necessarily abide by the terms of such agreements.
Nevertheless, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it heard evidence of
a settlement agreement the parties entered into concerning the sale of a motel, a portion of
which they owned as members of a limited liability company. Appellant is mistaken.
Under Utah law it is proper for the trial judge to hear evidence of settlement agreements
in divorce cases.
Appellant further asserts that evidence of the settlement agreement constituted
surprise under Rule 59(a)(3), U.R.C.P. Appellant argues surprise based, not upon any lack
of awareness of the evidence, but upon her claimed failure to anticipate that the trial
court, in calculating a division of assets in the divorce, would consider amounts Appellant
and Appellee received prior to the divorce from the proceeds of the sale of the hotel.
Because the trial judge must characterize the property as marital property or individual
property and then distribute property between the parties in a fair, systematic fashion, it
cannot be a surprise that the trial court would hear evidence of the settlement agreement.
Furthermore, under Utah law, a "surprise" at trial which could have been easily guarded
against by utilization of available discovery procedures may not serve as a ground for a
new trial. Here Appellant already had knowledge of the evidence and so cannot claim
surprise.
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Appellant asserts that the trial judge issued inconsistent rulings, first sustaining an
objection to evidence that Appellant received $200,000.00 and Appellee received
$150,000.00 for the sale of the hotel and then, ultimately, ruling that those were the
amounts received by the parties. Here, Appellant misconstrues the trial record.
Appellant objected to testimony as to why the parties received different amounts and
asserted that the amounts due the members of RCI, LC were to be equal. The court ruled
that the amounts from the sale to be credited the parties in the calculation of the division
of assets would be equal. The court did not contradict itself or issue inconsistent rulings.
Appellant construes evidence of the amounts received by the parties for the sale of
the hotel as a settlement compromise subject to the exclusionary rule of Utah Rules of
Evidence, Rule 408. Rule 408 is inapplicable to the facts of this case since the amounts
received by the parties for the sale of the hotel were never a claim which was disputed as
to either validity or amount. Furthermore, the evidence in question was not to prove
liability for or invalidity of the amount at issue. Rather, the evidence was to establish
marital property for purposes of making an equitable division of property in the divorce.
II

The trial court did not commit error when it declined to apply the statute of limitations to the
debt owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen

Appellant attacks the sufficiency of the trial court's findings with regard to marital
debts owed to Robert and Larue Larsen, claiming the court erred in finding that the statute
of limitations was inapplicable to the rental agreement. Appellant must fail in this
assertion since Appellant failed to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's
9

findings. The court found the debt supported by acknowledgment "by both parties
through the payments, exhibits, and credible testimony." Yet Appellant limits discussion
of evidence of the debt's status to whether a particular exhibit constitutes
acknowledgment of the debt. The trial court heard other evidence, ignored in Appellant's
brief, that supported the court's finding that the statute of limitations did not apply.
Furthermore, Appellant's argument as to the meaning of the exhibit mentioned above was
raised for the first time in Appellant's Brief and therefore may not be considered.
III. The Trial Court did not commit error when it found that interest and inventory were apart
of the marital debt
Appellant asserts that the court found that Appellant acknowledged a debt owed
for inventory and/or interest on the amount owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen. However,
there is no indication in the record that the trial court made any such finding. There is
likewise no indication in the record that Appellant raised these points before the trial
court. There is no discussion whatsoever in the record regarding the interest or inventory
amounts to which Appellant refers. Appellant's argument is raised for the first time in
Appellant's Brief and therefore may not be considered. Further, Appellant's Brief fails to
discuss any evidence related to a finding that Appellant acknowledged the inventory or
interest debt, much less does Appellant marshal the evidence supporting the findings as
required under the law and then demonstrate that, despite the evidence, the findings are
clearly erroneous.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court properly heard evidence of a settlement agreement between the parties
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it heard evidence of a settlement
agreement the parties entered into concerning the sale of a motel, a portion of which they
owned as members of a limited liability company. However the court was correct to
consider evidence of the settlement agreement as doing so was necessary in order for it to
distribute property between the parties in a fair, systematic fashion.
The trial court's duty to make an equitable division of property in a divorce action
encompasses all of the assets possessed by the parties. Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308,
1310 (Utah 1982) (quoting Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978). The
trial court must distribute property between the parties in a fair, systematic fashion and
should "catagorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate
property of one or the other. Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her
separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,
1172 (Utah App. 1990). Once the trial court finds that an item is marital property, the law
presumes that it will be shared equally between the parties unless unusual circumstances,
memorialized in adequate findings, require otherwise. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022
(Utah App. 1993). It is well established that the trial judge has considerable latitude of
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests in a divorce case. See, e.g.
Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1974).
11

The trial court found that the couple did not keep separate accounts and mingled
together their personal assets and liabilities with those of their various business ventures.
(Amended Findings of Facts & Conclusions of Law, ^f 19). This presented a challenge for
the court in determining how best to adjust the financial and property interests in the case.
In response to Appellant's objection to evidence of the settlement agreement, the trial
judge said, "The testimony is quite clear that everything was mixed and mingled." (Trial
Tr. P. 128:6-7), and later: "Fve got to come up with some number, because Fm going to
find that these parties owned interest in these things and they were married at the time this
happened." (Trial Tr. p. 132:18-21).
As will be discussed below, the trial court properly determined that evidence of the
settlement agreement was necessary in order to make an equitable division of property
and to distribute property between the parties in a fair, systematic fashion. The trial court
was correct to consider evidence of the Settlement Agreement because the trial court must
determine whether to be bound by its terms. Consideration of the evidence was not a
surprise as contemplated by U.R.C.P. 59 as asserted by Appellant. The trial court did not
reverse itself or make inconsistent rulings as asserted by Appellant. The settlement
agreement was not a compromise or an attempt to compromise a claim which was
disputed as to either validity or amount and so, contrary to Appellant's assertion, U.R.E.
408 does not apply to the facts of this case.
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A. It was proper for the Trial Court to consider evidence of the Settlement Agreement as it
is the Trial Court's prerogative to determine whether to be bound by the Agreement's
terms
It is the trial court's prerogative in divorce actions to make whatever disposition of
property, including the rights fixed in settlement agreements, as it deems fair, equitable,
and necessary for the protection and welfare of the parties. Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d
1080, 1082 (Utah, 1977); Mathie v. Mathie, 363 P.2d 779, 782-83 (Utah, 1961).
Although property settlements should be given great weight in the court's determination
of an equitable division, property settlements are not binding upon trial courts in divorce
proceedings and the court need not necessarily abide by the terms of such agreements.
Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P. 2d 184, 185 (Utah 1977); Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562,
563 (Utah 1983); Nunley v. Nunley, 757 P.2d 473,475 . Nevertheless, Appellant asserts
that the trial court erred when it heard evidence of a settlement agreement the parties
entered into concerning the sale of a motel, a portion of which they owned as members of
a limited liability company.
In marriage, the parties mingled together their personal assets and liabilities with
those of their various business ventures. (Amended Findings of Facts & Conclusions of
Law, f 19). This made it necessary for the trial judge to closely examine evidence of the
couple's financial and property interests. The Trial Court was within its discretion to hear
evidence of the Settlement Agreement to make whatever disposition of property,
including the rights fixed in settlement agreements, as it deemed fair and equitable.
13

B. Evidence of the Settlement Agreement was not a surprise which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against as it was evidence of marital property that the court would
properly consider in devising a fair distribution of property between the parties
Appellant argues that evidence of the amounts received by the parties for the sale
of the hotel constituted unfair surprise. Rule 59(a)(3), U.R.C.P. provides grounds for a
new trial if there was accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against. This section requires that the moving party show that ordinary prudence
was exercised to guard against the surprise. Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567
P.2d 174,n 176 (Utah 1977). Appellant does not argue that unfair surprise was caused by
the introduction of any evidence or testimony about which she had no prior awareness.
Instead, Appellant argues surprise based upon her claimed failure to anticipate that the
trial court, in calculating a division of assets in the divorce, would consider amounts
Appellant and Appellee received prior to the divorce from the proceeds of the sale of the
hotel. (Appellant's Brief p. 4).
The trial court's duty to make an equitable division of property in a divorce action
encompasses all of the assets possessed by the parties. Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308,
1310 (Utah 1982) (quoting Englert v. Englert 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978). The
trial court must distribute property between the parties in a fair, systematic fashion and
should "catagorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate
property of one or the other. Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her
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separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,
1172 (Utah App. 1990). Once the trial court finds that an item is marital property, the law
presumes that it will be shared equally between the parties unless unusual circumstances,
memorialized in adequate findings, require otherwise. Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1022
(Utah App. 1993).
Here, the trial court found the proceeds from the hotel to be marital property,
saying, "I've got to come up with some number, because I'm going to find that these
parties owned interest in these things and they were married at the time this happened."
(Trial Tr. p. 132:18-21). It is well established that the trial judge has considerable latitude
of discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests in a divorce case. See, e.g.
Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1974). In light of the trial court's duty to make
an equitable division of property and that this duty encompasses all of the assets
possessed by the parties, it is simply not credible for Appellant to claim surprise that the
trial court took into account amounts received by the parties before the divorce.
If Appellant felt that the amounts received for the sale of the hotel should not have
been shared equally between the parties, Appellant could have argued to the trial court
whatever special circumstances would, under Hall, require otherwise. Instead, Appellant
merely objected to any testimony regarding the question. The actions of the trial court are
presumed valid and it is Appellant's burden to prove such a serious inequity as to amount
to a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 700.
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Furthermore, under Utah law, a "surprise" at trial which could have been easily
guarded against by utilization of available discovery procedures may not serve as a
ground for a new trial. Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982). Here, Appellant
had full knowledge of the agreement and can hardly claim surprise as contemplated by the
Rule.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it considered evidence of the
amounts the parties received from the sale of the hotel, nor did such evidence constitute
surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
C. Appellant misconstrues the record in arguing that The Court reversed itself and issued
an inconsistent ruling
Appellant asserts that the trial court reversed itself and issued an inconsistent
ruling. It did not. Appellant claims that the trial court sustained Appellant's objection to
testimony that Appellee received $150,000.00 for the sale of the hotel and implies that the
court did so in part because " there was no evidence to support the amount...as a correct
representation of Petitioner's proceeds." (Appellant's Brief p. 5). But the court did not
sustain any objection to testimony or evidence that Appellee received $150,000.00 for the
sale of the hotel. Furthermore, when Appellant objected that there was no evidence to
support the amount as a correct representation of Petitioner's proceeds, the court did not
sustain Appellant's objection, but instead invited Appellant to cross examine Appellee
under oath. (Trial Tr. p. 37:1-5)
What the court did sustain was Appellant's later objection to witness testimony
16

about why the amounts received by Appellant and Appellee were different. (Trial Tr. p.
131:6-24). Appellant's counsel told the court:
"...[A]ll we were really trying to do is take the sales price of 4.2 million dollars,
subtract out all of the reasonable expenses that should be subtracted out to get to an
equity, and then divide that by four.
"We did all of that, and the process resulted in my client getting $200,000. Now
they're going to say, "No we overpaid her."" (Trial Tr. p. 134:1-8).
The court informed Appellant that if Appellant's objection were sustained, the
court would find that both parties should receive $200,000.00 credit for the sale of the
hotel. (Trial Tr. p. 132:18-22). Appellant asserts that this is inconsistent with the court's
ultimate finding that Appellant received $200,000.00 and Appellee received $150,000.00.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 5). But the court was clear that it was not ruling that the parties had
each received $200,000.00 for the sale of the hotel. The court meant instead that each
party should have received $200,000.00 and that the court would take that into account
when calculating the division of assets. (Trial Tr. 135:7-12).
Appellant misconstrues the trial record in asserting the trial judge issued
inconsistent rulings. The rulings of the court were consistent. The court never sustained
any objection to evidence that Appellant received $200,000.00 and Appellee received
$150,000.00 for the sale of the hotel. When Appellant objected to testimony as to why
the parties received different amounts and asserted that the amounts due the members of
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RCI, LC were to be equal amounts, the court ruled that the amounts from the sale to be
credited the parties in the calculation of the division of assets would be equal.
D. Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 408 does not apply to evidence of the settlement agreement
since the settlement agreement was not a compromise or an attempt to compromise a claim
that was disputed as to validity or amount
Appellant construes evidence of the amounts received by the members of RCI, LC
for the sale of the hotel as a settlement compromise subject to the exclusionary rule of
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408. Rule 408 provides that evidence of "accepting or
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting
to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount.95 Rule 408 is
inapplicable to the facts of this case since the amounts received by the parties for the sale
of the hotel were never a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount.
Furthermore, the evidence in question was not to prove liability for or invalidity of the
amount at issue. Rather, the evidence was to establish marital property for purposes of
making an equitable division of property in the divorce.
The trial court's duty to make an equitable division of property in a divorce action
encompasses all of the assets possessed by the parties. Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308,
1310 (Utah 1982) (quoting Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978). The
trial court must distribute property between the parties in a fair, systematic fashion and
should "catagorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate
18

property of one or the other. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App. 1990).
Furthermore, property settlements are not binding upon trial courts in divorce proceedings
and the court need not necessarily abide by the terms of such agreements. Naylor v.
Nqylor, 563 P. 2d 184, 185 (Utah 1977); Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562, 563 (Utah
1983); Nunley v. Nunley, 757 P.2d 473, 475 .
Since amounts received by the parties for the sale of the hotel were not a claim
disputed as to validity or amount, and since evidence of such amounts was not to prove
liability or invalidity of the amounts, and since trial courts in divorce proceedings have
discretion whether to even abide by the terms of settlement agreements, Rule 408 is
inapplicable to this case.
POINT II
The trial court did not commit error when it declined to apply the statute of
limitations to the debt owed to Robert and LaRue Larson
Appellant attacks the sufficiency of the trial court's findings with regard to marital
debts owed to Robert and Larue Larsen, claiming the court erred in finding that the statute
of limitations was inapplicable to the rental agreement. Appellant must fail in this
assertion since Appellant failed to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's findings
and raised an argument as to the meaning of one of the exhibits for the first time in
Appellant's Brief.
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A. Appellant neither marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's findings that
the statute of limitations on the rent debt was inapplicable nor demonstrated that such
findings were clearly erroneous
Appellant claims the trial court erred in finding that the statute of limitations was
inapplicable with regards to the rent debt. The trial court found that an amount of debt for
unpaid rent was not barred by the statute of limitations for purposes of including it as
marital debt. (Amended Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, TJ19). The court
specifically found that the debt was not barred by the statute of limitations because
regular payments on the debt had kept it alive. Id. ("The Court finds that the majority of
this debt of $101,000 is for past unpaid rent upon which the parties have made regular
enough payments to keep this debt alive in the Court's opinion."). The court went on to
say, "This debt is clearly not barred by the statute of limitations, it was acknowledged by
both parties through the payments, exhibits, and credible testimony received here today."
Id.
Appellant's brief limits its discussion of the issue to a narrow slice of the evidence
the court heard in connection with the rent debt, arguing that a particular exhibit, Exhibit
27, does not constitute acknowledgment of the debt for purposes of determining whether
the statute of limitations has run. But Appellant ignores other evidence considered by the
court. For instance, the court accepted and considered Exhibits 2, 12, and 26 all of which
20

Appellant relied on to show payments made over time for rent. (Trial Tr. pp. 42-47).
Appellant also ignores witness testimony concerning amounts paid over time for rent.
(Trial Tr. pp. 81-83; 85-92 ). Furthermore, Appellant's own counsel acknowledged rent
payments made at least as far back as the year 2000 - an acknowledgment that
undermines Appellant's argument that the debt is barred and supports the court's contrary
finding. (Trial Tr. pp. 154-57).
In order to prevail in overturning the trial court's findings, Appellant must marshal
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that, despite such evidence,
the findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence
and, therefore, clearly erroneous. Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991);
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)._Appellant has neither marshaled the evidence in support of
the trial courf s findings nor demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous.
Appellant instead cites only the evidence that Appellate hopes will support Appellate's
desired outcome, and ignores evidence supportive of the trial couifs findings.
Evidence heard by the trial court supporting the finding that the debt is not barred
by the statute of limitations includes evidence of regular payments made on the debt.
Under Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25 (1) an action on a contract, obligation, or liability not
founded upon an Instrument in writing may l>e commenced within four years after the last
charge is made or the last payment is received. Further, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 says,
"In any case found in contract, when any part of the principal has been paid, or an
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acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same,
shall have been made, an action may be brought within the period prescribed for the same
after such payment, acknowledgment or promise;..." Here, the trial court considered
evidence of payments made on the debt and determined that the debt was not barred.
Appellant should not prevail in overturning the trial court's findings as Appellant
neither marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's findings that the statute of
limitations on the rent debt was inapplicable nor demonstrated that such findings were
clearly erroneous.
B. Appellant's argument that Exhibit 27 was intended only to demonstrate errors in
Appellee9 $ calculations is a new argument raised for the first time on appeal
Appellant argues in Appellant's Brief that Exhibit 27 was prepared "to
demonstrate only for illustrative purposes that if the amount of the claimed rent owed to
Robert and LaRue Larson were accepted, that Respondent's [Appellant's] equity in the
business would still be an amount grater than had been previously offered by Petitioner to
Respondent to resolve that part of the case." (Appellant's Brief, p. 12). But the portion
of the record sited by Appellant to support this argument tells a very different story. "We
were trying to figure out how much my client should get for Fashion Furniture. We had
taken care of the motel matter and were trying to resolve Fashion Furniture. So these
exhibits, the one No. 27 was prepared simply as her calculations of what she thought the
value of the business was, what she thought she should receive." (Appellant's Brief p.
12, quoting Trial Tr. pp. 136-37).
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the trial court must address an argument
before it maybe considered on appeal. OngInternational (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.,
850 P.2d 447, 455n.31 (Utah 1993). An argument is deemed to have been raised before
the trial court if the trial court had an opportunity to enter findings of fact and/or
conclusions of law. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 788, 801 (Utah App. 1987).
Here, Appellant's argument from Appellant's Brief was not made to the trial court.
Appellant's argument that Exhibit 27 was prepared "to demonstrate only for illustrative
purposes that if the amount of the claimed rent owed to Robert and LaRue Larson were
accepted, that Respondent's [Appellant's] equity in the business would still be an amount
grater than hadl)een previously offered," was not addressed by the trial court and the trial
court had no opportunity to enter findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding
Appellant's claim. Appellant's argument therefore may not be considered on appeal.
POINT in

The Trial Court did not commit error when it found that interest and
inventory were a part of the marital debt
Appellant attacks the sufficiency of the trial courf s findings with regard to marital
debts owed to Robert and Larue Larsen, claiming the court erred in finding that a debt
was owed for inventory and interest. Appellanf s Brief asserts that the court found that
Appellant acknowledged a debt owed for inventory and/or interest on the amount owed to
Robert and LaRue Larsen, (Appellanf s Brief, p. 13). However, there Is no indication in
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the record that the trial court made any such finding, so it is difficult for Appellee to know
just what Appellant is arguing and how to respond. There is likewise no indication in the
record that Appellant raised these points before the trial court. There is no discussion
whatsoever in the record regarding the interest or inventory amounts to which Appellant
refers. Appellant's argument is raised for the first time in Appellant's Brief and therefore
may not be considered. Further, Appellant's Brief fails to discuss any evidence related to
a finding that Appellant acknowledged the inventory or interest debt, much less does
Appellant marshal the evidence supporting the findings as required under the law and
then demonstrate that, despite the evidence, the findings are clearly erroneous.
A. Appellant's argument that the trial court erroneously concluded Appellant
acknowledged debts for inventory and interest is a new argument raised for the first time
on appeal
Appellant's assertion that the trial court found that Appellant acknowledged a debt
for inventory and interest is made for the first time in Appellant's Brief. There is no
mention in the trial record of any such finding by the trial court and Appellee has doubts
as to whether Appellant is correct. Nevertheless, as Appellant's assertion is argued for
the first time on appeal, Appellant's claim that the trial court found acknowledgment of
the debts should not be considered.
To Preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue before
the trial court. Hart v. Salt Lake City, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah App. 1997). The trial
court must address an argument before it may be considered on appeal. Ong
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International (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455n.31 (Utah 1993). An
argument is deemed to have been raised before the trial court if the trial court had an
opportunity to enter findings of fact and/or conclusions of law. James v. Preston, 746
P.2d 788, 801 (Utah App. 1987). Even if the trial court did find acknowledgment of
inventory and interest debts as Appellant asserts, Appellant made no mention of it until
the time of Appellant's appeal and the issue therefore should not be considered.
B. Even if the trial court found that Appellant acknowledged the debts for inventory and
interest, Appellant neither marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's findings
nor demonstrated that such findings were clearly erroneous
In order to prevail in overturning the trial court's findings, Appellant must marshal
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that, despite such evidence,
the findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence
and, therefore, clearly erroneous. Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991);
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Appellant has neither marshaled the evidence in support
of the trial court's findings nor demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous.
Appellant instead cites only the evidence that Appellate hopes will support Appellate's
desired outcome, and ignores evidence supportive of the trial court's findings. Appellant
should therefore not prevail in overturning the trial court's findings.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court properly heard evidence of a settlement agreement between the parties. It
was proper for the Trial Court to consider evidence of the Settlement Agreement as it is the Trial
Court's prerogative to determine whether to be bound by the Agreement's terms. Evidence of
the Settlement Agreement was not a surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against as it was evidence of marital property that the court would properly consider in devising a
fair distribution of property between the parties. Appellant misconstrues the record in arguing
that The Court reversed itself and issued an inconsistent ruling. Finally, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 408 does not apply to evidence of the settlement agreement since the settlement agreement
was not a compromise or an attempt to compromise a claim that was disputed as to validity or
amount.
The trial court did not commit error when it declined to apply the statute of limitations to
the debt owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen. Appellant neither marshaled the evidence in support
of

the trial court's findings that the statute of limitations on the rent debt was inapplicable nor

demonstrated that such findings were clearly erroneous. Appellant ignored evidence used by the
court to determine that the debt was not barred. Appellant's argument that Exhibit 27 was
intended only to demonstrate errors in Appellee's calculations is a new argument raised for the
first time on appeal.
The Trial Court did not commit error when it found that interest and inventory were a part
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of the marital debt. Appellant's argument that the trial court erroneously concluded Appellant
acknowledged debts for inventory and interest is a new argument raised for the first time on
appeal. Even if the trial court found that Appellant acknowledged the debts for inventory and
interest, Appellant neither marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's findings nor
demonstrated that such findings were clearly erroneous.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's appeal should be denied on all counts and the trial
courts well-reasoned findings and order should be upheld. Appellee Alan Larsen asks for an
award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal.

DATED this

1U

day of / ^ ° ^ ^2095
DOUGLA8T. NEELEY
Attorney for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of November, 2005,1 mailed a true and correct
I do hereby certify that on this
copy of the foregoing Brief Of Appellee, postage prepaid, to Gary H. Weight, Attorney for
Appellant, at 290 West Center Street, P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah, 84603-0200.
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ADDENDUM
Amended Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law
Trial Transcript

DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290
Attorney for Petitioner
1st South Main, Suite 205
P.O. Box 7
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: (435)835-5055
Facsimile: (435)835-5057
IN THE SLXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALAN R. LARSEN

:

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT &
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

:

Civil No. 034600001

DEBRA D. LARSEN

:

JUDGE PAUL D. LYMAN

Petitioner,

Respondent.

:

:

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 23rd day of February, 2004, before the
Honorable Judge Paul D. Lyman. Petitioner appeared in person and was represented by his attorney,
Douglas L. Neeley. Respondent appeared in person and was represented by her attorney, Gary
Weight. The Court, having received evidence, the parties having testified in support of their
pleadings, and the Court having heard argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises, now makes and enters its:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Petitioner is a bona fide resident of Sevier County, State of Utah, and has been for
more than three (3) months immediately prior to the commencement of this action.
2. Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife, having been married on August 9, 1974,
in the City of Richfield, County of Sevier, State of Utah.
3. During the course of the marriage, the parties have experienced difficulties that cannot be
reconciled. The Petitioner should be granted a divorce from the Respondent based upon these
irreconcilable differences which divorce should become final upon its entry.
4. During the marriage, there have been three (3) children born as issue of this marriage, two
(2) of which have reached their majority. The remaining minor child of the parties is Dalian Robert,
born July 7, 1988.
5. The Respondent is a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody, and control
of the minor child, subject to liberal visitation with the Petitioner that includes, at a minimum, the
frequency and schedule outlined in Utah Statute §30-3-35.
r

6. Both of the parties should be permanently enjoined from saying or doing anything in the
presence of the minor child (or in such a manner that the child will become aware of the party's
comments or actions) to convey any negative information, beliefs, feelings, etc., regarding the other
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parent, or doing or saying anything that would in any way harm the relationship between the child or
the other parent. Both parents are to encourage the creation and maintenance of a strong and healthy
relationship between the other parent and the child. In no event shall either party demean or
disparage the parent in the presence of the child, or permit any third party to do so.
7. It is important for the minor child to have contact with his older sisters, his paternal
grandparents, and other relations as well. The Respondent should make a concerted effort to
encourage and support these relationships, as they should encourage and support the minor child's
relationship with the Respondent. This may involve allowing extra time for visits, allowing visits in
her home, etc.
8. It is reasonable and proper that both parties be required to maintain in effect a policy of
dental, health, and accident insurance, at all times that such may be available through their respective
employers at a reasonable cost, with the minor child of the parties named beneficiary thereunder.
Further, each party should pay one-half (14) of any deductible amounts, co-payments, and one-half
(Vi) of all non-covered medical and dental expenses (including, but not limited to, accidents, surgery,
orthodontics, ophthalmology, optometry [including eyeglasses], cavities/fillings, psychological and
or psychiatric care, hospitalization, broken limbs, physical therapy, continuing illnesses, allergies, etc.)
for said minor child.
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9. A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and
payment of the expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment.
10. Each party should reimburse the other party within 30 days for his or her share of any
medical or dental expense that has been paid by the other party that are not covered by health
insurance for the child.
11. Both parties should be entitled to receive a credit in addition to the base child support
amount for one-half (14) of the monthly medical insurance premiums actually paid for the benefit of
the minor child of the parties.
12. The custodial parent should be ordered to provide a copy of the Decree of Divorce to
each creditor providing medical or dental services for the minor child. Pursuant to UCA §15-4637(1953), each creditor should be notified by the custodial parent that the creditor is prohibited from
making claim for unpaid medical expenses against a parent who has paid in full that share of the
medical and dental expenses required to be paid by that parent by the Decree of Divorce. Each
creditor receiving a copy of the Decree of Divorce should also be notified that the creditor is
prohibited from making a negative credit report or report of debtor's repayment practices or credit
history regarding a parent who has paid in full that share of the medical and dental expenses required
to be paid by that parent by the Decree of Divorce.
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13. Each party should pay one-half (V2) of the cost of the custody evaluation, the business
evaluation, and the appraisal on the home. By March 1, 2004, the parties should exchange
documentation in regards to the amounts they have paid and the remaining balances.
14. The Petitioner should be awarded the income tax deduction for the minor child for the
tax year 2003. The Respondent should receive the deduction for 2004, the Petitioner for 2005, and
the Respondent for 2006.
15. In regards to alimony, the Court finds that the parties jointly owned the van and the
furniture business together from 1984 until November of 2002. Both parties had an equal share in
the job responsibilities in this business and all income derived from the business, including the
payment of insurance, house payments, credit card payments, and other extra payments made by the
business, was joint income to the parties, even though Mr. Larsen was given credit for the income
from the sole proprietor business for social security purposes, it was still joint income. Consequently,
the historical earnings for the parties are exactly the same and alimony is not appropriate in this case.
16. The Respondent is entitled to the standard formula for determining retirement money due
to her. Because the parties chose to put everything under Mr. Larsen's name for income and social
security purposes from 1984 to 2002, that will be the time period that social security should be
treated for retirement. The denominator in the formula will be the period of the marriage with the
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period from 1984 to 2002 as the numerator. The Court is considering this as retirement, but will not
require a QDRO to be prepared because the Court does not believe you can file them against the
Federal Government, but that formula will be applied. The Court is not directing Mr. Larsen to apply
for social security, but whenever he chooses to do so, that portion set out above, using that formula,
will be owed to Mrs. Larsen at the time he begins receiving those benefits.
17. In regards to the historical incomes of the parties, the Court cannot use those incomes
because it appears to the Court that we have a business that is going through its last phases, it's going
out of business, the hotel has been sold, Mrs. Larsen has no income and hasn't had any for some time.
As set forth above, the parties had equal joint income for many, many years. Consequently, the Court
is going to find that for child support purposes, Mr. Larsen has $1,500 per month in income earning
ability at this time. Mrs. Larsen has income earning potential at $6.00 an hour for a full-time job,
which computes to $1,032 per month and the Court is going to impute that income to her for child
support determination, which the Court thinks is reasonable. Mrs. Larsen needs to get a job. Both
of these earnings appear to be temporary and the Court would anticipate that either one of these
parties, or both, will be filing a modification in the near future, based upon a change of the earnings
of the parties, since their monthly claimed expenses exceed and in most cases triple or quadruple what
they are both trying to tell the Court they can earn.
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18. Based upon the foregoing, the Petitioner should pay $209 per month to the Respondent
as child support for the minor child beginning February 15,2004, and each month thereafter until the
child reaches 18, graduates from high school, whichever occurs last, or until modified by the Court
19. The Court finds specifically in determining property values and to what is owed and not
owed by the parties in regards to debts, both personal and business, that the parties commingled the
assets and liabilities of the furniture business, the hotel business, and the personal business, which is
evidenced by the way they used their business assets to purchase orfinancepersonal assets, used their
personal credit cards to finance and pay business debts, and used business assets and credit to pay
other business debts or to acquire other business assets. For example, they used their personal van,
which was paid for, to finance and pay debt incurred in the furniture business. The Court simply has
to treat the entire assets and debts as a group. The testimony is that in regards to the sale of the
motel, Mrs. Larsen received $200,000 and Mr. Larsen received $150,000, which leaves a $50,000
shortfall. The parties have stipulated that the business values and debts would be determined as of
November 1, 2002, not today, consequently the Court will accept this date for its division of assets
and debts. In addition, all of the evidence has come in with that date as the date to use in dividing
up the assets and debts. The Court will use November 1, 2002, for its determination in dividing the
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assets and debts of the parties, in valuing the assets of the parties, and in equitably dividing the same.

That Court has not addressed the values, debts, and assets as the attorneys argued it should,
but rather as the Court determines the divisions to be equitable given the evidence and testimony
received.
First, the Court will lay out the Robert and LaRue Larsen debts. These are monies owed to
them by the parties. Respondent's Exhibit No. 26 acknowledges the debt owed for back rent and
loans made to the parties. Petitioner offered Exhibit No. 12 which also illustrates, verifies, and
acknowledges the same debt in the sum of $101,125.93 as ofNovember 1, 2002. Each party offered
an exhibit using the exact same figure and it appears to the Court that at an earlier date, each of the
parties acknowledged and agreed that this sum was owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen. This debt
did include the $15,000 loan. However, the $42,000 was paid back with interest and this figure of
$101,125.93 does not include this loan. When the Court goes through the schedules, the two (2)
loans are clearly accounted for with the $42,000 having been paid, with interest, in September of
2001. The Court finds that the majority of this debt of $101,000 is for past unpaid rent upon which
the parties have made regular enough payments to keep this debL^liveinJiiei^cairt's opinion. This
debt is clearly not barred by the statute of limitations, it was acknowledged by both parties through
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the payments, exhibits, and credible testimony received herejtoday^ The Court finds that this debt is
Alan's and he is to hold Debbie harmless on this debt.
20. Now, turning to the other business debts and again using the November 1, 2002, date,
the first debt illustrated on Exhibit 6 and then on Exhibit 18. It showed that there was $18,978.49
in the furniture business account on November 1, 2002. The Court has gone through and added the
checks, not accepting Petitioner's counsel's figure, and the Court comes up with $27,468.18, a
shortfall of $8,489.69. The second debt the Court has considered is the accounts payable debt from
Exhibit 7 where the parties agreed the $7,132.31 was duplicate of Exhibit 6 and 7, the Court did not
take it off of Exhibit 6, but the Court is taking it off of Exhibit 7. The Court finds then that from the
$46,811.46, less the $7,132.31, the net accounts payable are $39,679.15 as of November 1, 2002.
21. The next debt the Court considers are the credit card debt balances as of November 1,
2002, that come off of Exhibits 3 and 29. The total there was modified by the parties during trial and
the Court finds that the total owed on the credit cards as of November 1, 2002, was $22,742.23.
22. The second mortgage on the house was clearly done for business purposes and again
illustrates the commingling of the business assets and debts with the parties' personal assets and
debts. The Court finds that the balance owed on the second mortgage as of November 1, 2002, was
$21,869.38 which is found on Exhibit no. 10. Likewise, the van debt was clearly incurred by the
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parties for business purposes and the Court finds that the debt owed is $10,731.14, exactly as stated
on Exhibit no. 11. Lastly, the Court heard testimony in regards to the credit card debt incurred after
the parties' separation. Alan said the debt was incurred, Debbie said it wasn't, that is from Exhibits
4 and 30. The Court is finding that Debbie did in fact incur $5,623.04 of credit card debt after the
parties' separation of November 2002.
23. Having considered all of the debts, the Court finds the total to be $109,134.63 in debts
which are business debts which should be paid by Alan and hold Debbie harmless from those debts,
which the Court notes include the second mortgage and the van debt, which will become relevant
below.
24. Now there are a couple of other loose ends that need to be addressed by the Court.
There are two (2) debts that Debbie proved she should have received one-half (Vi) of. First, in
regards to the tax refund. The Court finds that Debbie's story is more believable than Alan's story
and the Court finds that the refund was in fact $ 1,186.19. The second amount was the balance in the
parties' personal checking account in Zions Bank in November of 2002. The total of those debts the
Court finds is $5,761.99, which Alan received. One-half (Vi) of those two (2) amounts is $2,881,
which should be paid or credited to Debbie.
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25. On the other hand, we have Alan who paid for the family's health insurance, Alan and
Debbie's life insurance, and the van insurance. The portion that is for the family health insurance is
a family obligation and if someone would have gotten sick or hurt, the parties would have had to pay
those expenses, so the Court declines to give Alan any credit for those payments. However, on the
life insurance in the sum of $4,912 and the van insurance of $978.40, these were all for Debbie's
benefit, totaling $5,890.40, the Court does not consider those payments, made by Alan, to be a family
obligation, and Alan should get credit for this amount.
26. In regards to the marital home of the parties, the parties have stipulated the value to be
$ 150,000 on November 1, 2002, and the Court so finds. The balance owed on thefirstmortgage was
$88,803, which was also not disputed by the parties. The Courtfindsthat the net equity in the marital
home to be $61,197.
27. The business evaluator found the furniture business value to be between $300,000 and
$325,000. The parties' counsel both stated that the evaluator said it was worth $300,000 on the
phone when they each questioned him about that and the Court considers those representations
together with the Court's finding that this business was and is a failing venture. Based on the
foregoing, the Courtfindsthe appropriate and fair value of the business to be $300,000 on November
1,2002.
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28. Having considered the foregoing and having madefindingsin regards to the assets, both
personal and business, the debts, both personal and business, and each parties' respective obligations
and credits, the Court makes the following findings and conclusions of law in equitably dividing the
assets and debts of the parties in this matter as of November 1, 2002.
A. Debbie is awarded the marital home which value is $150,000, less the first
mortgage of $88,803, leaving a total net equity of $61,197. One-half Q/i) of that equity should be
awarded to Alan in the sum of $30,598.50, which should become payable upon the house selling,
Debbie moving from the home, cohabits, remarries, or the minor child turns eighteen (18), whichever
occurs first. No interest shall accrue on the lien of $30,598.50 in favor of Alan, but which is a set
amount of money that will be paid within about three (3) years or sooner.
29. Now in regards to the businesses of the parties, the Court finds it appropriate and
equitable to divide he same as follows, giving each party the credits and obligations set out above.
Alan should be awarded the furniture business. The furniture business value is $300,000, less the
Robert and LaRue debt_of$101 J2^93^J^hich_wa&^ffirmed by both parties-hy testimony and their
respective written statements, less the other business debts and credit card debts found above totaling
$109,134.63, which Alan should be ordered to assume and hold Debbie harmless therefrom, which
leaves a total net equity in the business of $89,739.44. Debbie's net equity from the business is
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$44,869.72, which represents 50%. However, from this net equity, the Court needs to look at other
factors and equities./Debbie received $50,000 more than Alan from the hotel sale. jMan paid
$5,890.40 after the separation that directly benefitted Debbie and for which he should get credit,
which totals $55,890.40, which should be paid by Debbie to Alan, less the amounts Alan already
received from the bank accounts and tax refund of $5,761, leaving $53,009 total that is owed to Alan
by Debbie.
30. However, when the Court applies the equity Debbie has in the furniture business awarded
to Alan of $44,869.72 against the amount owed to Alan from Debbie of $53,009, her net equity in
the business is totally wiped out because she has already received $8,100 more than Alan. Alan
would be owed the $8,100 in total net equity from the two (2) businesses. The Court is not required
to make things even or divide equities exactly and it declines to do so in this matter. The Court will
not require Debbie to pay this $8,100 difference, it is just fiction, a nominal amount given the figures
the Court has dealt with in this case and the equities applied. Alan is awarded the business with the
debts listed above and Debbie does not have to pay him back for the monies she has already received.
He doesn't have to pay her back for the tax refund and the checking account balance, this is what the
Court believes is fair and equitable in this matter and the Court is going to find that the division set
forth herein is fair. All of these figures the Court sees are questionable things that everybody had
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argued about all day like the back rent owed, which I have clearly found in Alan's favor. He may
never pay his parents the rent and loan owed, but it clearly is a legitimate debt that was owed by the
parties on November 1, 2002. That is why I have divided and found as I have so that there is a clear
break between these parties and the entanglements they have encountered during the marriage. This
division allows for a clean break. When the minor child reaches eighteen (18) years of age or any of
the other events occur outlined above, Debbie will owe Alan his equity from the marital home,
otherwise the parties are divorced and no longer connected in any businesses or entanglements.
31. The parties have acquired personal property during the marriage. Alan will draft two (2)
lists of the personal property items including those in the home, the personal property at the store,
and the truck and van. Said lists will be presented to Debbie on or before March 8, 2004. Debbie
will pick which list of property she wants and should be awarded the same. Alan then will be
awarded the property identified on the remaining list. Each party should be awarded the personal
property they have acquired since separation in November 2002.
32. Each party should bear their own costs and attorney's fees incurred herein.
33. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are
required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
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34. Should either party fail to abide by the provisions of a Decree of Divorce issued herein,
that party should be liable for indemnification of the other, including attorney's fees and Court costs
incurred in the enforcement of the Decree of Divorce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties in the above-entitled matter, and the parties are
entitled to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
2. The parties should be awarded a Decree of Divorce, to become absolute and final upon
entry by the Court herein.
3. The Court concludes that all other issues of dispute have been resolved by the Court
pursuant to the above Findings of Fact.
DATED this

day of July, 2004.

JUDGE PAUL D. LYMAN
District Court Judge
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TO THE PARTIES ABOVE-NAMED:
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2), this proposed Order will befiledwith the Court five days
after service upon you. Your objections, if any, must be filed with the Court within five days after
service.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that on this
day of July, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing proposed Amended Findings Of Fact & Conclusions Of Law, postage prepaid, to Gary
H. Weight, Attorney for Respondent, at 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 84603-0200.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that on this
day of July, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing signed Amended Findings Of Fact & Conclusions Of Law, postage prepaid, to Gary
H. Weight, Attorney for Respondent, at 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box"L", Provo, Utah 84603-0200.
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1

THE COURT: Ckay.

2

MR. WEIGHT: Totally liquidated.

That will leave some

3

personal -- or some business property; a truck, a trailer, a

4

computer, some of those other items.

5

personal property, and how that should be divided I guess is an

6

issue.

7
8

THE COURT: That's fine.

Attorney's fees at issue or

not?

9
10

I guess that then becomes

MR. NEELEY: I think usually we would say each pay
their own.

11

THE COURT: Okay, each pay their own, and a name --

12

MR. NEELEY: There is one issue.

13

THE COURT: Will there be a name change?

14

MR. NEELEY: No.

15

THE, COURT: No?

16

MR. WEIGHT: There is an issue of —

Okay, go ahead, sir.
this may just

17

go into personal property, but there is an issue of the tax

18

refund that came shortly after the separation, and we think

19 j it'snot a F ersonai prop erty a nd that needs to be shared.

1
Then

,20

we disagree that the RCI , that is the' motel business here in

21

town , is an issue , but I guess we just

22

(inaudible) that.

In other words, we be lieve we 've been before the Court

23

and we've

24

That by aigre ement , it was not one of the issues that we th ink

25

was reserved for today.

st ated to the (~ourt that tha t has been resolved.

The b usiness was sold.

They took
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1

their —

2

were.

3

they all signed an agreement as to what their shares
She received her share.
If it's disproportionate that's not our fault.

We

4

agreed to what her share was.

5

can bring that back in to try to modify any amount that she

6

received from that settlement or have it affect any amounts

7

that she may receive from additional assets.

8

—

we can argue that, I guess, is what

9
10

So we now disagree that we

THE COURT: Yeah.

I think that's a

—

I think you need to argue that, and

why are we picking November 1st, 2002?

11

MR. NEELEY: It's when they split.

12

MR. WEIGHT: Separation date.

13

MR. NEELEY: Separation.

14

THE COURT: So you want me to make these divisions as

15

of that date, and not as -of today?

16

MR. WEIGHT: With respect to the

17

THE COURT: And both parties agree with that?

18

MR. WEIGHT: —

19

THE COURT: With the —

20

MR. WEIGHT: That's right.

21

THE COURT: Because normally I would divide it as

22

—

with the business, Fashior Furniture
okay, and that's stipulated to?

of today, what the assets were today, but if you folks were
r

23
24
25

agreeing that it's November lrt, 2002, on the record stipulating
to it, that's fine.

I'll do it as of that day.

MR. NEELEY: For Fashion Furniture that's what we've
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and did that for two years.

2

That they had an opportunity to sell the business.

3

They no longer wanted to be partners.

4

Alan and his wife wanted to be out and no longer wanted to

5

be partners.

6

business.

7

His brother Jerry

—

So they have actively attempted to sell the

They've had several offers.

They eventually got an offer last year that they all

8

wanted to take.

9

with them —

They attempted to get Mrs. Larsen to negotiate

Mrs. Debra Larsen, the defendant —

to negotiate

10

with them and to help them in closing the transaction.

11

an LLC that Mr. Chamberlain had drafted for them, and pursuant

12

to that LLC the majority are able to sell the property.

13

It was

She was still putting up a resistence to that, and it

14

came to the point where they were going to lose the sale, and

15

Jerry Larsen agreed to give her $200,000 from the sale proceeds

16

in order to save the sale.

17

received $150,000 from the sale of the motel.

18

mania] receipt was $35^,000 tcta1 **"-w t u e sa 1 ^ of the motel.

19

MR. WEIGHT: Your Honor, can I interpose my objection.

Alan Larsen would testify that he
So together the

20

I have already indicated to the Court that I would object to it

21

as part of the proffer, and ask that it be stricken for this

22

reason.

23

have occurred, and the parties have been paid, and that is not

24

an issue.

25

been before the Court and represented that that was done.

He's testified about some of the negotiations which

That has never been reserved as an issue.

We've
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So it can't come back in, but if it's going to come

2

back in, if the Court's going to allow that testimony, then I

3

have a copy of the escrow instructions and waiver agreement

4

that I will submit to the Court as an additional exhibit, which

5

is signed by all the parties, and agrees in there that her

6

share is $200,000.

7

division.

8
9

It makes no mention of any disproportionate

Makes no mention of any distress -- I mean, a worry
of losing a sale.

It's a hand —

or an arm's length, clean

10

transaction between all these parties where they agreed based

11

upon evidence we presented and their evidence, that her share

12

in that business was $200,000.

13

MR. NEELEY: He can offer that, and I don't dispute

14

anything he said, but the fact of the matter remains that that

15

was an asset that was obtained during the marriage

16

THE COURT: I'll look at your evidence, because if

17

that would be —

1

relevant -vidence.

8

19
20

—
—

I think that's reason -- or not reasonable
So I'J1 go * z):-* -= 1^-1:.

^- -h:v.d

—

1 _ll3_

that and show me that.
MR. NEELEY: But our response is, objection would be

21

that these parties received proceeds from an asset that was

22

totally obtained and (inaudible) during the marriage, and the

23

$350,000 is what came to the parties from that asset.

24
25

MR. WEIGHT: Assuming —

the second part of my

objection goes to this, your Honor.

He represents today that
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1

THE COURT: The hangup, Mr. Weight, is this.

This is

2

a proffer.

3

examine Mr. Larsen as to what he actually received, I'll put

4

him under oath.

5

then it's perjury and it would make a difference, okay?

6

If you don't want to accept it, you want to cross

I'll allow you to do that.

If he's lying,

MR. WEIGHT: Well, and I appreciate that, your Honor,

7

and I know we can do that, but I think —

8

go to whether or not he got 150 necessarily._ We don't know

9

that except for his work.

My objection is that this part of

10

the case is settled.

11

got her share, he got his share.

12

it was done by agreement.

13
14

my objection doesn't

We aren't even dealing with this.

If they're disproportionate

MR. NEELEY: That had nothing to do with the divorce
action.

15

MR. WEIGHT: It does.

16

MR. NEELEY: That was an LLC to split up --

17"

MR. WEIGHT: But the LLC they owned, as a marital

18

She

asset, their portion of the LLC.

19

THE COURT: Okay, let's go onto some other issues.

20

MR. NEELEY: All right.

21

THE COURT: And you can provide whatever documents you

22

want to show the other.

23

MR. WEIGHT: Thank you.

24

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Neeley.

25

MR. NEELEY: In addition to the $42,000, your Honor,
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MS. LARSEN: Alan and she had that together.

2

MR. WEIGHT: Who wrote it?

3

MS. LARSEN: Alan.

4

MR. WEIGHT: Okay.

It's the handwriting of Alan Larsen

5

written on this exhibit, and my client will testify that the

6

exhibit is an exhibit that was produced by Mrs. Larsen, the

7

mother.

8

1050 per month, it looks like, 7/7/02, and the conversation

9

that occurred regarding that notation was that she said at that

It's her own document, and at the top of it is written

10

time there would be no rent due prior to July 7th of ^02, but

11

rent would be at the rate of 1050 a month after that, and if it

12

was paid and continued to pay it, that the back rent would be

13

forgiven.

14

So we show the Court this document, and then we also

15

have attached to it the history of the payments, and the next

16

two pages after the first page, and then there's two pages

17

after that -- or three pages after that that show the amounts

16 I —

and again, your Honor., these °1~ca t> e disputed docur^nU:,

19

disputed documents Mr. Larsen -- or Mr. Neeley says he doesn't

20

want in because they're part of the settlement negotiation, but

21

these were not prepared by my client.

22

Mrs,. Larsen or by Alan Larsen.

23 I

These were prepared by

The last page, the very 1 ast pj^e_sJiows a composition

24

of the rent that would be due if the Court gives credit for the

25

payments that are reflected on the documents in the last four
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years.

So that's what her testimony would be and that's what

2

these exhibits purport to show.

3

THE COURT: Okay.

4

MR. NEELEY: I don't know (inaudible).

5

Could I look at

that exhibit?

6

THE COURT: Yes.

7

MR. WEIGHT: Should I just put it there.

8

THE COURT: You want it?

9

MR. WEIGHT: Yes.

10

MR. NEELEY: Is it part of Exhibit 2, this right here?

11

MR. WEIGHT: Yes.

12

MR. NEELEY: This?

13

MR. WEIGHT: Yes.

14

MR. NEELEY: Your Honor, I'm objecting to the —

15

to

that exhibit.

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17

MR. NEELEY: And let me state the objection, and I'll

18

nivp

t-hp Court --

19

THE COURT: Go ahead.

20

MR. NEELEY: —

another exhibit to verify what I'm

21

saying.

22

Counsel both before Mr. Weight entered the picture and after

23

Mr. Weight entered the picture, and I'm going to offer

24

Petitioner's Exhibit No. 26.

25

My objection is that these documents were given to

On the top of that exhibit, it comes from Ogden
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Carpets.

2

senior Mr. and Mrs. Larsen.

3

documents were prepared and presented to Counsel and his client

4

and Counsel before in settlement negotiations.

5

their intent was for, and that's how they got them, and I

6

object to his use of those settlement negotiation documents to

7

draft any of the other documents.

8
9
10
11

That is Jerry Larsen.

He did the accounting for the

The date on that is 11/03.

Those

That's what

MR. WEIGHT: And my response to that would be is he
saying that these documents are not true and accurate and
reflect the actual accounts then -MR. NEELEY: But he's purporting them to be that they

12

agreed that -- with their theory of the case, that all payments

13

ought to be applied as they are received.

14

computation of all the things of the parties, and parties were

15

talking about that settlement negotiations, what's owed to

16

the Larsens because of all the back rent and all of the

17

everything they've borrowed them over the years.

We offered a total

—

So we

!

13 I urspared that. Horument.
19

THE COURT • But -- and I as Iced this question earlier.

20

Are the facts that are stated in th ese thing s true?

21

you answered, "Yes. tt

I think

22

MR. NEELEY: Th ey are true.

23

THE COURT: Because I don't see here what I would

24

typ ically see in a settlement negctiati on is

25

we think you ewe .

Here's what

This is what you thi nk we owe.

We '11 pay
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1

X, okay?

2

something above whatever would be the math you're —

3

saying you're willing to do, but not as much as the other side.

4

I don't see any of that in discovery.

5

MR. NEELEY: Because

6

THE COURT: Do you see what I'm saying, Mr. Neeley?

7

you're

—
I

don't see any kind of a —
MR. NEELEY: I do, because the response that we got

8
9

Which then indicates to me a willingness to pay

back —

and I'll —

if you want me to, I will enter a document

10

they gave back, and it was prepared by Debbie in settlement

11

negotiations, and she uses our figure of $101,000 owed to the

12

Larsens, but I don't think that's fair to do because that's

13

settlement negot_ia_tian-s-,

14

says, "Likely the inventory is this.

15

-- here's what we owe the Larsens, $101,000," and that's a

16

document she prepared.

17

If she gave us back a document that
Here is what the Larsens

THE COURT: You can certainly put her on the stand and

ia

ask her if at th?t point-sh" --j-csc -- r>~ "he f^t

19

whatever.— I don't know what the circumstances were.

20

like c-

MR. NEELEY: We were doing settlement negotiations,

21

though.

22

asking her about it, but if we're going to open that door then

23

I will ask her that.

I don't -- I mean, I think the rules preclude me from

I've got the documents she prepared.

24

THE COURT: Frankly I —

25

MR. WEIGHT: My understanding about his argument, your
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1

Honor, is he 's suggesting that because it was presented in

2

settlement negotiations it's different than what it would be

3

withou t the settlement negotiations.

4

that.

5

I think he's answered

THE COURT: See, Mr. Neeley, that' s the trouble I'm

6

having .

7

fact.

8

I will net consider that.

9

Ms. Larsen does not say today that she felt like they owed

10

If it's a fact —

If it ' s- a settlement offered for some different figure,

$101,000.

11

if it's a fact, it's a fact, it's a

No;,, I see what you're dsying, i&

Do think she's not going to say that?

MR. NEELEY: No, she's not going to say that.

She's

12

going to -- I'm sorry, he just put their exhibit.

13

saying that —

14

settlement negotiations to support her statement today that

15

she only owes $16,000 to the Larsens, when in settlement

16

negotiations she said she owed $101,000, and her document says

17

that.

18
19

They're

they're using our exhibit we used in the

THE COURT: And what is this document you've got?

Is

it a letter?

20

MR. NEELEY: Well, it's a computation just like that.

21

THE COURT: So it's more stuff like this.

Well, I can

22

ask her the same question.

23

I'm going to allow you to introduce whatever you want, Mr.

24

Neeley.

25

MR. NEELEY: Okay.

Is it a fact or is it net a fact?
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THE COURT: I think the door is wide open.

It's been

2

opened by Mr . Weight, and I'm not seeing the tradit ional stuff

3

I see in settlement negotiations.

4
5

MR. NEELEY' Well, because there were cover letters
with, <and then he said, "Here's what our client's p.repared."

6

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

All right, but still I'm not

7

seeing the cover letter where you say, "Okay, you give me 50 or

g

7^ or ?c;, and eve:, though I think it's this, it's — " because

9

that's the stuff we usually see in settlement negotiations.

10
11

MR. NEELEY: I agree that's usually what we see when
there's reasonable minds.

12
13

THE COURT: That's right.
please.

14

MR. WEIGHT: Your Honor, let's go to the next exhibit,

15

No. 13, is a group of documents.

16

summary.

17

So go ahead, Mr. Weight,

The first of that is the

Then the remaining pages are backup.
If the Court will look at the first page, what we're

18

doing here is attempting to help the Court understand the

19

income of Mr. Larsen.

20

a salary, but in addition Fashion Furniture paid certain of his

21

personal debts, which for IRS purposes might give him a lower

22

income for tax recording, but not for computation of income for

23

child support or alimony.

24
25

Mr. Larsen was paid by Fashion Furniture

So we've set forth on the page by month the additional
payments Fashion Furniture made for Mr. Larsen that were more

1
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MR. WEIGHT: 2000.

2

THE COURT: —

3

2000, that is the combined earnings of

you two, not --

4

THE WITNESS: Yes.

5

THE COURT: —

6

THE WITNESS: Correct.

7

MR. WEIGHT: After that they incorporated and started

8
9

just your earnings?

paying wagc=>.
THE COURT: Okay.

Got a couple more questions.

10

THE WITNESS: Sure.

11

THE COURT: The exhibit you've got.

12

THE WITNESS: This one?

13

THE COURT: Yeah.

14

Do we

—

Your mother wrote this, right?

Is

that her writing?

15

THE WITNESS: It is on the top, yes.

16

THE COURT: Okay, except for

17

THE WITNESS: Except for my writing on the very top.

18

THE COURT: The little scribble at the top with the 77.

—

19

All right.

20

you want to look over his shoulder, Mr. Neeley.

21

page 3 of that exhibit I see what is 7 —

22

and in column 3, which is called "Payment," I see four straight

23

months of $1,050.

24

and she credited you with paying that $1,050 for those four

25

months; is that right?

Does someone have a copy he can be given, and if
When I look at

you know July of '02,

So I assume that that means that you paid

- 82THE WITNES S: Well, I don't know if it. was for those

1
2

four months, but we made that payment.
THE COURT: Made the jfour payments in those four

3
4

months 7

5

THE WITNESS: TheDse payments during th at time, yes .

6

THE COURT: All right, hang on.

7

Th<sn you missed a

month, be November.

6

THE

9

THE COURT: And then you made two more.

10

WI,PTN7SSS:

Okay.

printout is this -- these pages?

11

THE WITNESS: That's Jerry's.

12

THE COURT: Jerry's?

13

THE WITNESS: He was just helping put this on a spreadsheet, make sense of it.

16
17

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: Yeah, that's —

that amount would have

been towards rent.

20
21

On January of '02 you have $42,650

applied to rent; is that right?

18
19

What did Jerry have to do with

this?

14
15

Whose computer

THE COURT: Okay, and that's the $42,650 that came from
where?

22

THE WITNESS: That money is money that we got from

23

borrowing, I think, from my parents, or at least that amount of

24

money.

25

THE COURT: So they loaned you that money.

If I
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understand the testimony right, you stuck that in the hotel?

2

THE WITNESS: Yes.

3

THE COURT: But when you paid it back to them, for some

4

reason it was credited towards the rent?

5

THE WITNESS: Yeah, that's right.

6

THE COURT: Why?

7

THE WITNESS: Because we owed so much rent.

8

•liiE COURT: okay.

9

THE WITNESS: That was intended to catch up, get it

10

paid.

11
12

THE COURT: And that was the money that was loaned out
in September; is that correct?

13

THE WITNESS: Yeah, that is.

14

THE COURT: So you two, from everything I can see from

15

this, mixed and mingled the accounts at the furniture store,

16

along with the accounts from the hotel; is that right?

17

THE WITNESS: And pe rsonal, too.

18

THE COURT: And personal.

19

THE WITNESS: The furniture store paid a lot of our

20

personal bill.s at that time.

THE COURT: I have no other questions right now.

21
22

25

If

ei ther of youi have questions •
CROSS EXAMINATION (resumed)

23
24

It did really mix.

BY MR. NEELE^
Q.

And visa-versa; you also used personal credit cards,
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at least $20,000 sometimes to pay for store debts?

2

A.

Absolutely.

3

Q.

From personal credit cards?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And you used the vehicle --

6

A.

I think more than that.

7

Q.

—

8
9

you used that as collateral and put that back into

the business also?
A.

Exactly.

That's what I did.

10

MR. NEELEY: Okay.

11

THE COURT: Do you have any questions you want to ask

12

him, Mr. Weight?

13
14

MR. WEIGHT: No further questions of this witness.

I

call LaRue Larsen.

15
16

I think that's all the questions.

THE COURT: Okay.

Mrs. Larsen, if you'll come forward,

ma'am, stand in front of her and raise your right hand, please.

17

COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony

18

you're about to give in the case now before the Court will be

19

the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help

20

you God?

21

THE WITNESS: I do.

22

THE COURT: Go ahead and have a seat over there,

23

please.

24

MR. WEIGHT: Did the Court get back No. 12?

25

THE COURT: Yes.

Which is 12?

That's the one I was
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looking at?

Yeah.

Do you need it?

MR. WEIGHT: Yeah.
THE COURT: Okay.
LARUE LARS EN,
having been first duly sworn,
testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR

WEIGHT:

Q.

Will you please state your name.

A.

LaRue Larsen.

Q.

And you're the mother of the petitioner in this case?

A.

Yes.

Q.

I've handed to you what has been admitted as Exhibit

12; do you see that?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Is the handwriting on the document except for what is

right at the very top your handwriting?
A.
Q.

Yes.
Was it your practice to make a ledger like this one

and to give it to your son and his wife each year?
A.

I'm not sure that I gave it to them, but I tried to

keep track of when they paid rent.
Q.

Until beginning of 1994, which is the entry on the top

of the page, is that when you first started this particular
exhibit?
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A.

No, I have others at home.

2

Q.

I'm sorry?

3

A.

I have others since 1984.

4

Q.

Okay, but that page right there, do you think that

5

page was started in 1994?

6

A.

I'm not sure.

7

Q.

You see the first page at the top.

8

It says, "1994,"

and then there's some montns and dates listed beIcT*» that.

9
10

It probably was.

A.

I may have gotten —

gone back to this on this time.

I'm not sure.

11

Q.

I just asked you if-could you see those dates.

12

A.

Which dates?

13

Q.

At the very top, and then the word date you see the

14

No. 1994.

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

That represents the year 1994; is that correct?

17

A.

Uh-huh.

18

Q.

And then below that there's a 1-9 and 5-6; do you see

19

those?

20

A.

Uh-huh.

21

Q.

Isn't it true that in that year you started this

22

ledger, and then you filled in that information each month as

23

—

24
25

you filled it in as those months occurred?
A.

I didn't.

I think that I'd gone back and written down

what I've had down before.
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1
2
3
4
5
6

Q.

Pick a needle.

Do you know if you did or are you not

sure?
A.

I haven't kept adding on it, because it's —

I've gone

back and filled in where I've kept record of them.
Q.
1999.

Okay.

Look at the bottom where you come to the year

Do you see that?

7

A.

Uh-huh.

3

Q.

IL shows ar. entry on 7/6 of '99 and 11/29 of '99.

9

The

first entry is $5,000 and the second entry is $10,000; do you

10

see that?

11

A.

Ye.s.

12

Q.

And is that a payment that was made to you by Alan and

13

Debra; those two payments?

14

A.

I think so.

15

Q.

And then

16

A.

It must be.

17

Q.

Then at the very bottom there's 2001, and under that

18

—

it says, "1-17," and then "$12,600"?

19

A.

Uh-huh.

20

Q.

And then to the right of that "for year 2000"?

21

A.

Uh-huh.

22

Q.

In other words

23

A.

In other words they were paying late all the time.

24

Q.

This is a late payment that you credited for 2000,

25

right?

—

-88That's right

1

A.

Because I put a question mark there.

2

Q.

And then if you'll look at the next page, and then go

3

Are you at the third page?

one more

4

A.

Uh-huh.

5

Q.

And near the middle of the pag e it's got the date that

saysf "S eptember- x01. //

6
7 '

A.

Uh-huh.

8

g

There i s t h e e n t r y oi $1,050, and m e n t o t h e righu of

9

t h a t $42,000; do you see t h a t ?

10

A.

Uh-huh.

11

Q.

That's the payment that was made -- or-I mean, a loan

12

that was made by you and your husband to your son and daughter-

13

in-law?

14

A.

Right.

15

Q.

And then you go down to where it says, "January A 02;"

16

do you see that?

17

A.

Uh-huh.

18

Q.

And to the right of that, should be in the very middle

19

of the page, there is an entry of $42,650?

20

A.

Uh-huh.

21

Q.

That represents a repayment of the loan, $42,000;

22

doesn't it?

23

A.

I think so.

24

Q.

And when the payment was made, ycu commented to Debra

25

i that you've paid 42 -- you've paid $850 additional, and she
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says, "That's for interest."

2

any interest, and she says, "Well, but you deserve it."

3

remember that conversation?

You said you weren't expecting
Do you

4

A.

I didn't know that I wasn't —

5

Q.

Do you remember her commenting to you that she was

6

yeah, I don't know.

paying you interest for the $42,000?

7

A.

Yes, I remember a comment and she was saying interest.

8

Q.

Okay.

9
10
11

Then did you ever tell her thct: you were going

to apply the $42,650 toward rent as opposed to the loan payment
that you were talking about that she paid?
A.

No.

12

MR. WEIGHT: That's all. '

13

THE COURT: Mr. Neeley.

14

MR. WEIGHT: Your Honor, I just have two more questions

15

or one, maybe.

16
17

THE COURT: Go ahead.
Q.

BY MR. WEIGHT: Okay.

On top of that same exhibit,

18

Mrs. Larsen, on the front page, can you see an entry that says,

19

"Due/' a nd then there's some lines and then there's "1050," and

20

it looks like the words "per/mo, 7/7/02;" do you see that?

21

A

22

Q.

23
24
25

*

Is it on the very front?
Yes, the very, very top of the page at the right-hand

side; do you see that?
A.

I don't.
THE COURT: It's in different handwriting.
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Q.

BY MR. WEIGHT: Right here.

2

A.

Oh, here.

3

Q.

Yeah.

4

A.

Okay.

5

Q.

Is that your handwriting?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Do you recall a conversation you had with Mr. Larsen

8

'.;hcn he icti.;ned irom a i rip he took to Las Vegas, and where

9

you told him that he and his wife would no longer have to pay

10

any back due rent as long as they would be faithful in paying

11, of rent after that date?
12

A.

No.

It really wouldn't be fair to our family or to

13

the other kids to forget about that grant that they owed.

14

always --

15

Q.

That's not my question whether it's fair or not.

I

I'm

16

asking you if you did make a representation to your son that

17

you were going to forgive that debt?

18

A.

No.

19

MR. WEIGHT: Okay, that's all.

20

THE COURT: Mr. Neeley.

21

MR. NEELEY: Th ank you.

22
23
24
25

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. NEELEY:
Q.

When they took over the store the rent was different

tha n l t is now; is that correct?
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1

A.

Right.

2

Q.

How much —

3

A.

When we were first starting out, we set the -- Robert

do you recall how much it was at first?

4

figured the rent for the space that we had —

5

Alan and Debbie had to be 1400.

6

time, so he reduced the rent to 700.

7

amount of the —

S

rent 650.

9

but they didn't se-em to be able to make the rental payments.

for the space

Then they were having a hard
Then they deducted the

our cancer insurance payments.

So.it made the

My husband said we needed to always raise the rent,

10

In fact, they were borrowing money all of the time, and so we

11

just didn't ever raise the rent..

12

Q.

Okay, but you did raise it after that to 1,050?

13

A.

When Jerry and Diane moved out of the building then

14

they were using that space.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

A.

Right.

17

Q.

Okay, to 1,050?

18

A.

Yeah.

19

Q.

And they continued to pay your insurance?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And they continued to do that?

22

A.

Uh-huh.

23

Q.

Now, while Debbie was running the store and paying the

Then they got more space, you raised the rent?

24

bills, did she ever tell you she was net going to pay you your

25

rent?
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A.

No.

2

Q.

You can't remember having conversations with her about

3
4

the payment of rent?
A.

We tried to settle up with the rent, rental payments,

5

and tried to meet and do it, but we had a hard time getting

6

together.

7

C.

Okay.

The exhibit that Counsel showed you, the 2nd and

8

3ld page, was that prepared by —

9

pages of that?

who prepared the Znd and 3rd

10

A.

Jerry put it on my computer as a spreadsheet.

11

Q.

Okay, and that was based on the information that you

12

gave him?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

From the records that you kept?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

In regards to exhibit -- oh, the exhibit that we

17

talked about that has the —

18

amount due.

19
20
21

I think it's No. 6.

It has the

THE COURT: Exhibit 6, okay.
Q.

BY MR. NEELEY: I'm going to hand you what's been

marked Exhibit 6, okay?

Do you recognize that document?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Did you work on that yesterday and last night and this

24
25

morning?
A.

Yes.
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MR. WEIGHT: Your Honor, I'll object to this testimony,

2

and I'm going to do it on the basis that I've raised objections

3

previously.

4

the Court.

5

is simply nothing here for us to address.

6

That is, that this part of the case is not before
It's been resolved.

That has been paid, and there

THE COURT: I think there is.

7

The testimony is quite

clear that everything was mixed and mingled.

There were

i

8 I payments that were showing up as this or that, applying it
9

towards the loan payment, but it looks to me like its paying

10

may be applied towards rent.

11

two out, and that's just 'from the testimony I've heard.

12

think it's relevant, and I am going to consider it.

13

ahead and ask the questions, Mr. Neeley.

14

Q.
to work —

16

form in regards to the motel?
A.

18

and we —

19

myself.

I do

So go

BY MR. NEELEY: How did it come about that you needed

15

17

I don't know how you can sort the

well, first, what kind of relationship did you guys

RCI was a partnership, limited liability company,
with four members; Alan and Debbie and my wife and

20

Q.

Alan and Debbie had it before you got involved?

21

A.

Right.

22

Q.

Correct?

23

A.

They had two partners, actually.

24

Q.

Okay, and then when you got involved did ycu infuse

25

They had been partners?

additional capital into the partnership?
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the last two pages appear to be the actual offer to purchase.

2

THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I'm getting there.

3

THE COURT: No, hang on.

4

THE WITNESS: Yeah.

5

THE COURT: So what's your objection now?

6

MR. WEIGHT: My objection is this, your Honor.

Hang on.

He's

7

testifying that they gave her what she wanted.

8

like, "We were under pressure to sell this property.

She was

•9

making demands, and so we gave her what she wanted."

That's

10

not what this agreement says.

11

different than that in paragraph 4.

12

In other words,

It says something quite

THE COURT: I don't know that it contradicts.

It says,

13

"The parties represent and agree that she'11 get that much

14

money."

15

MR. WEIGHT: The words I'm looking at

16

THE COURT: And they were to

17

MR. WEIGHT: —

—

—

says, "Receive as her share."

So if

18

she received that as her share, that assumes that everybody

19

agreed that that was what her one-quarter interest of the

20

business to be, her share, $200,000.

21

that went into arriving at that are merged in that paragraph,

22

and the $50,000 he's testified about and all these other

23

representations are merged into an agreement that that's her

24

share.

25

THE COURT: Okay.

So if —

All of the negotiations

and since he and —

so if I
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sustam what you're saying, if I do that, what have I got here?

2

What I've got is --

3
4

MR. WEIGHT: What I think you've got is you've got to
throw out his testimony, because

5

—

THE COURT: Well, how do I figure —

since these guys

are mixing money back and forth, I've got to come up with
something.

Do I just simply say, "Fine, $200,000 to her and

$200,000 to him"?

9

Because I'm willing to do that, but I don't

think that's what you want, and I'm more than happy to say

10

that both of these people get $200,000 credit for the motel

11

interest, period.

12

That —

and if you want that, we're done with the

13

questioning.

14

or we could hear what he's got to say, but I don't think you

15

can have it both ways, Mr. Weight.

16
17

I'll take it as the evidence, and I'll move on,

MR. WEIGHT: Well, I don't know (inaudible).
know what he got, but what I'm

18

THE COURT: That's ex —

We don't

—
and I've got to come up with

19

some number, because I'm going to find that these parties owned

20

interest in these things and they were married at the time this

21

happened.

22

it or I'm going to say they both got $200,000.

23

So either I'm going to get testimony to come up with

So your choice is I either hear what's going on, and

24

I may decide that yeah, it was some different number, or I'm

25

going to just give it 200 each and be done with it, because as
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I see it, this is a package deal, and you want to separate this

2

out, and given the evidence I've heard today, I can't sort this

3

out.

4

"She gets $200,000 free cash."

5
6

say,

I cannot just sequester this one little thing and

MR. WEIGHT: Okay.

I can't do that.

Well, if the Court can't do that,

then I guess --

7

THE COURT: You see what I'm saying?

I just —

these

8

parties, had they kept separate accounts, had they never done

9

anything to comingle funds, had they never done anything like

10

that, I would have bought what you've —

11

that way.

12

but the evidence isn't

MR. WEIGHT: Well, my position on that is this, your

13

Honor.

14

asset (inaudible).

15

that were buying this property, and then we also entered into

16

negotiations between the four owners of the business; Jerry and

17

his wife and Alan and Debra.

It got to a point where there's going to be one marital
We entered in negotiations with the parties

18

THE COURT: Yes, sir, you're right.

19

MR. WEIGHT: And there were a lot of numbers that were

20

put back and forth between these parties on what they thought

21

their claims were and what they thought the equity of the

22

business was so it could then be divided four ways to give it

23

to the four partners.

24
25

They finally settle on a number that we presented, and
the number that we presented was that we think -- now they say
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we had disputes with their numbers, but all we were really

2

trying to do is take the sales price of 4.2 million dollars,

3

subtract out all of the reasonable expenses that should be

4

subtracted out to get to an equity, and then divide that by

5

four.

6

We did all of that, and the process resulted in my

7

client getting $200,000.

8

overpaid her.

9

Now they're going to say,

,v

No, we

THE COURT: Given what you just said, if the amount was

10

divided by four and it's $200,000, I'll give her $200,000, he

11

gets $200,000 when I figure out my total numbers.

12

with me.

13

more testimony on this matter.

14
15

Fair enough

Then in that case, Mr. Neeley, I won't accept any

MR. WEIGHT: That's what we think that the motel part
of this case is all about, but what I'm concerned is --

16

THE COURT: (Inaudible)

17

MR. WEIGHT: —

—

I'm not sure I agree with the Court's

18

statement that you're going to say at least get 200 and --

19

THE COURT: I'm going to do a little sheet and say

—

20

because this is in the middle of the divorce, it's 2003, and if

21

I put 200,000 on her ledger, I'm going to put 200,000 on his

22

ledger, call it quits and be done.

23

don't want me to hear any more of his testimony and I've not

24

heard any other dollar figure other than that, and I'll be

25

happy to do that.

If you don't -- because you

We'll be done with Jerry's —

at least this
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1

line of testimony.

2

other things.

3

Mr. Neeley can certainly ask him about

I don't know what he's going to say.

MR. WEIGHT: Well, I don't either.

All I know is that

4

she had $200,000.

5

was after all of the negotiations represented her one-quarter

6

interest in both the motel property, and six acres adjoining.

7 .

It was by this agreement she got it, and it

THE COURT: Okay, I'm going to sustain the objection.

8

Don't ask any more questions about this.

9

have $200,000 on the final ledger sheet as their interest in

10

Each of them will '

the hotel.

11

MR. NEELEY: What he should receive?

12

THE COURT: Yes, sir, that's right.

13

MR. NEELEY: Even if he didn't receive it?

14

THE COURT: We're taking no more testimony on it.

15

That's —

when I do my ledger, that's how we'll do it.

16

other questions you want to ask Mr. Larsen?

17

MR. NEELEY: No.

18

THE COURT: Or Mr. J e r r y

19

MR. NEELEY: No.

20

THE COURT: Mr. W e i g h t ,

21

MR. WEIGHT: No.

22

THE COURT: Thank you very much, sir.

23

seat.

24

you'd like to offer?

25

Any

Larsen?

a n y t h i n g y o u ' d l i k e t o a s k him?

Okay, Mr. Neeley, we're still to you.

MR. NEELEY: Yes, I would call Mr. —

You can have a
Anything else

well, I could
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1

proffer.

2
3

THE COURT: Why don't we do a proffer, because we're
running

—

4

MR. NEELEY: Okay.

Mr. Larsen would proffer, your

5

Honor, that he does not have a two-year degree.

6

Snow College, but he never got a two-year degree.

7

doesn't have any other training other than what he's received

8

as a salesman in the furniture business.

9

completes —

He did attend
That he

That after he

that his brother has agreed to pay him $1,500

10

a month, that's while he liquidates -- a month, while he

11

liquidates the inventory from Fashion Furniture.

12

he will be unemployed.

13

he was going to Las Vegas, because he does not intend to leave

14

the area.

15

He did not tell the custody evaluator

He hopes to find a job selling somewhere here.

THE COURT: Okay.

You'll accept —

16

rebuttals of those particular things?

17

examine him on those issues?

18
19

MR. WEIGHT: I don't need to cross examine him, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.

21

MR. NEELEY: No.

22

THE COURT: Over to you, Mr. Weight.

24
25

is there basically

Did you want to cross

20

23

Affer that

Anything else, Mr. Neeley?

Anything else

you'd like to present?
MR. WEIGHT: Your Honor, I didn't ask my client about
Exhibit No. 27.

If the Court will get that, I'll just tell the
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1

Court what her testimony was going to be.

2

THE COURT: Which one is 27?

3

MR. NEELEY: That's the

4

THE COURT: Oh, okay, good.

5

one.

6

that.

Okay, go ahead.

—
That's this most recent

You're going to make a proffer about

Please do.

7

MR. WEIGHT: (Inaudible) wasn't initially (inaudible)

8

THE COURT: Yeah, okay.

9

MR. WEIGHT: And she will testify that before we agreed

10

finally, that the business would be evaluated and we would use

11

the value of inventory as of November Vr,

12

all occurred and we reached that agreement, we actually did it

13

on an order to show cause hearing.

14

2002.

Before'that

We were trying to figure out how much my client

15

should get for Fashion Furniture.

16

motel matter and were trying to resolve Fashion Furniture.

17

So these exhibits, the one No. 27 was prepared simply as her

18

calculations of what she thought the value of the business was,

19

what she thought she should receive.

20

We had taken care of the

That exhibit I think doesn't really help us at all,

21

because the —

22

exhibit, No. 26, is simply a business record.

23

her testimony, your Honor.

as part of the negotiation, whereas the other
That would be

24

THE COURT: Mr. Neeley?

25

MR. NEELEY: Nothing further, your Honor.
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you.

2

THE COURT: Go ahead.

3

MR. WEIGHT: Your Honor, my summary of the argument is

4

—

5

to the Court, and I'll go through it simply so that the Court

6

understands what I'm doing here.

was written for my benefit so I could go through and argue

7

THE COURT: Okay.

8

MR. WEIGHT: We indicated to the Court that in the

9

telephone conversation we had with Bruce Hughes he told us

10

that the value of the inventory as of 11/1/02 was $300,000,

11

the .report he has, which is admitted as an exhibit.

12

in bold on the second page that he gives it a range of 300,000

13

to 325.

He states

14

I did not -- I subpoenaed him, but I released him from

15

the subpoena because I was confident that he would testify just^

16

exactly what his reports states.

17

argument that I've made, or this summary here, I'm using the

18

$300,000 figure.

19

the business evaluation determines that more than 300,000

20

should be the starting number, then the Court can add to my

21

bald calculations my clients share.

22

So we proffered it, but the

If the Court after reading the evaluation,

We start, your Honor, with the rent issue.

That's the

23

first deduction I show from the business equity value.

24

our position that the amount of $13,600 is owed, and we come to

25

that number this way.

It's

For four years the total rent of -- that
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1

was paid at the rate of $1,050 would be $50,400.

2

from that the amount of $15,000, which comes in Exhibit 12,

3

showing that there were a 5,000 and a $10,000 payment, and

4

then in addition they wanted $12,600, and then $4,200, which

5

represents payments made July, August, September, October, and

6

right after -- well, I can show the Court where he does it.

We deduct

7

On Exhibit 12

8

THE COURT: UKay, I'm looking at Exhibit 12.

9

MR. WEIGHT: And it's page 3 of the last group of

10

—

pages.

11

THE COURT: Okay.

12

MR. WEIGHT: January, February, March, April of 2003

13

there's acknowledgment that that amount of money was received,

14

and we claim that that should be deducted.

15

THE COURT: Right.

16

MR. WEIGHT: That amount of deduction

17

THE COURT: Okay, slow down.

18

me.

—

You just

you've lost

You said 15,000, 12,600, and 4,200?

19

MR. WEIGHT : Yes.

20

THE COURT: Those are the amounts?

21

MR. WEIGHT

22

THE COURT: From the $50,400?

23

MR. WEIGHT

24

THE COURT: And those figures came from page 3?

25

MR. WEIGHT: Well, if you're looking for all the

That's right.

That's correct, and then --
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1

2
3
4
5

figu res, the y came from th e first page

—

THE COURT: Okay, I can find the 2001, 12,600 fcDr the
year 2000.

I found that.

MR. WEIGHT : Okay, and right above that there r s 5, 000
and 10,000 f or

—

6

THE COURT: Okay.

7

MR. WEIGHT: That's the 15.

8

THE COJRT: OKay.

9

MR. WEIGHT: Then on page 3 where you've seen

All right, and that' s the 15, 000?

4,200.

10

THE COURT: Fine.

11

MR. WEIGHT: Okay.

12

THE COURT: Let's see, page 3, 4,200?

13

MR. WEIGHT: At the very bottom of the page at the

14

corresponding number.

15

THE COURT: You bet.

16

MR. NEELEY: I don't have a page 4.

17

MR. LARSEN: Where does it show that?

18

THE COURT: Right there.

19

MR. NEELEY: This is page 4?

20

THE COURT: It's page —

21
22

Show me —

oh, page 4.

Okay.

it's not 4 either.

It's 1, 2,

3, 4, 5, 6.
MR. WEIGHT: The summary of it all, your Honor, is on

23

the very, very last page of Exhibit 12.

24

THE COURT: Okay, I'm with you.

25

MR. WEIGHT: And so the IS -- tnere's $50,400 minus

All right.
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the 31, 8000 -- 31,800, excuse me, which consists of the 15,

2

12,6 and the 42.

3

Mr. and Mrs. Larsen, and that's the first thing I put in my

4

summary of the argument.

Leaves a balance of $18,600 that is owed to

5

THE COURT: Okay, I'm with you.

6

MR. WEIGHT: Right.

7

THE COURT: Slow, but I pick it up eventually.

g

MR. WEIGHT: I'm glad I don*t nave to be in your

9

position.

I understand that.

Under that you see it says, "Zero important."

10

Takes our argument that there was some agreement that all

11

past due would be forgiven as of 7/7/02.

12

from that date, so

It's paid current

(inaudible).

13

THE COURT: Okay.

14

MR. WEIGHT: Credit card debt, we represent that from

15

the amount of the business equity, business value should be

16

deducted 22,742.23.

17

to that number.

That is on Exhibit 3.

We both stipulated

18

THE COURT: Okay.

19

MR. WEIGHT: Then we've deducted it as a business debt,

20

and their number of $10,731.14 on Exhibit 11, we accept that,

21

and then the big squabble is over the business debt, which is

22

the amount that I had indicated to the Court as 28,566.87.

23

get that number by looking at Exhibit 31 and Exhibit 6.

24
25

I

If I may, your Honor, on Exhibit 6, Exnibit 6 is a
large exhibit that has a big paperclip on the left-hand side.

